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Analysis of Risk Management Proposals 
  
At the request of several members of the Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and 
Forestry of the Senate, FAPRI has continued to analyze the impacts of two alternative risk 
management proposals.  The proposals are the Farmers' Risk Management Act of 1999 (S. 1666) 
and the Risk Management for the 21st Century Act (S. 1580).  Our earlier analysis, as reported in 
FAPRI Policy Working Paper #04-99, had concentrated on the aggregate net farm income and 
government outlay impacts.  With this analysis, we consider a number of additional factors that 
may shed light on the differential impacts of the two plans: 
 
1.  Farm-level income impacts under alternative weather scenarios; 
2.  Additional indirect impacts, such as a change in ability to obtain financing; 
3.  Implications of within-year price shocks; 
4.  Benefits from changes to the Non-Insured Assistance Program; 
5.  Development of specialty crop insurance products; and 
6.  Administrative and producer costs of S. 1666. 
 
Conditioning Assumptions 
Representative farm-level analysis is conducted for several types of farms including both 
irrigated and non-irrigated cotton farms in Tom Green County, Texas; dryland wheat farms in 
Morton County, North Dakota and Sumner County, Kansas; and a corn farm in Webster County, 
Iowa.  The premium subsidy structure that would exist without adoption of S. 1580 is the same 
as was in place in 1998.  The (unsubsidized) premium rate structure in place for the 2000 crop 
year is maintained under both S. 1580 and the baseline program.  Yield risk is reflected in the 
distributions we employ.  Farmers optimize their crop insurance choice by examining the 
marginal benefits and costs of each insurance product and coverage level. Additional detail on 
the farm-level analysis can be obtained by contacting the authors. 
 
Farm-Level Income Impacts 
 Table 1 compares the maximum expected revenues less producer-paid premiums for the 
five representative farms under the baseline, S. 1580, and S. 1666.  Expected revenue is found by 
computer simulation using the specified yield distributions.  Revenue equals price times 
simulated yield.  If the yield is below the yield guarantee an indemnity is added to the revenue.  
Expected revenue equals the average revenue over 5,000 simulated yields.  Crop insurance 
coverage levels are set to maximize net revenues in each case.  In all of the representative farm 
cases, some level of crop insurance coverage is optimal.  However, in looking at crop insurance 
participation, we see many producers who do not participate.  There are several reasons for this.  
The risk profile of the farms may be different than those shown below, making crop insurance 
less attractive.  Some producers may have tried crop insurance in the past and found their 
expectations were not met.  Other producers avoid enrollment in any government programs.  
Even in the deficiency payment and AMTA programs, there was not 100 percent participation.  
The increased premium subsidy structure of S. 1580 will make crop insurance more attractive to 
some of these producers.  In our earlier aggregate analysis, we showed crop insurance 
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participation in the 2001 crop year rising from 68.9 percent in the baseline to 74.6 percent under 
S. 1580. 
 
In our analysis, both policies increase revenues for all of the farms by at least 50 cents an 
acre from baseline levels.  For the irrigated cotton farmer, per acre revenues rise by over five 
dollars under both programs.  Revenues are highest for four of the five farms under S. 1666.  
Only the dryland cotton farmer receives higher revenues from S. 1580.  But the differences in 
revenues between the two proposals are less than $1.50 in all cases (less than 1.5 percent of 
baseline revenues). 
 
Table 1.  Maximum Expected Revenues less Producer Premiums 
 Baseline S. 1580 S. 1666 
 Coverage Revenue- Coverage Revenue- Coverage Revenue- 
 Level Premium Level Premium Level Premium 
Farm (percent) ($/acre) (percent) ($/acre) (percent) ($/acre) 
Irrigated Cotton 65 374.73  75 379.83  65 381.20  
Dryland Cotton 65 161.27  65 163.57  65 163.51  
ND Wheat 65 54.86  65 55.43  65 56.19  
Corn 75 283.97  80 287.38  75 288.73  
KS Wheat 65 91.71  75 93.16  65 93.33  
 
Farm-Level Income Impacts Under Various Weather Scenarios 
 Table 2 compares the net payments (risk management payments and indemnities less 
producer-paid premium) that would be received under the two proposals under two weather 
scenarios for each of the representative farms.  Yield insurance is assumed for both programs.  
The coverage levels used in Table 2 for S. 1666 are 65% for the cotton and wheat farms and 70% 
for the corn farm.  For S. 1580, coverage levels are 75% for the cotton and wheat farms and 80% 
for the corn farm.  The coverage levels for both programs are based on optimization of marginal 
benefits and historical average coverage levels.  The weather scenarios were chosen from 
historical events within each county.  Also, the weather scenarios were chosen so that 
indemnities would be received under both programs in one year and no indemnities would be 
received in the other.  Clearly, there are scenarios where S. 1580 would result in an indemnity 
payment and S. 1666 would not.  The yield levels in the weather scenarios were set to the county 
average yield in the selected year. 
 
The risk management payments are determined by multiplying the actual production 
history yield, the price level, and an allocation factor.  For these cases, the actual production 
history yield is estimated by the average county yield for the 1990-98 period.  The price is 
determined using the average price level determined by the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation 
for the 1997-99 period.  Based on recent historical data for the value of production of insurable 
crops, the allocation factor is set at 1.5%.  Under S. 1666, the irrigated cotton producer receives a 
risk management payment of $6.47/acre.  The dryland cotton producer receives $2.24/acre.  Risk 
management payments for the North Dakota and Kansas wheat producers are $1.33/acre and 
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$1.62/acre, respectively.  For the Iowa corn producer, risk management payments equal 
$4.76/acre. 
 
 
Table 2.  Comparison of Outcomes for Specific Weather Years  
   Cumulative Risk Payment Indemnity Net Payment  
   Probability* S. 1666 S. 1580 S. 1666 S. 1580 S. 1666 Difference
Farm Year Yield (percent) ($/acre) ($/acre) ($/acre) ($/acre) 
Irrigated 1975 326 26 6.47 74.57 38.57 46.14 24.17 21.97 
Cotton 1990 863 73 6.47 0.00 0.00 -28.43 -14.40 -14.03 
          
Dryland 1998 68 22 2.24 76.20 60.60 53.67 46.35 7.32 
Cotton 1990 428 78 2.24 0.00 0.00 -22.53 -14.25 -8.28 
          
ND Wheat 1988 2 12 1.33 32.25 27.15 26.83 24.50 2.33 
 1992 32 88 1.33 0.00 0.00 -5.42 -2.65 -2.77 
          
Corn 1993 79 10 4.76 66.00 38.00 58.08 37.70 20.38 
 1994 169 73 4.76 0.00 0.00 -7.92 -0.31 -7.61 
          
KS Wheat 1996 10 6 1.62 37.50 28.50 33.42 27.70 5.72 
 1997 50 95 1.62 0.00 0.00 -4.08 -0.80 -3.28 
*Probability that yield will be equal to or less than the yield used in the calculations shown in the adjacent column.  
The probabilities are based on the yield distributions.  
 
Table 2 shows that the farm income consequences of crop insurance and the two plans 
can change tremendously under different weather scenarios.  In a low-yield year, such as 1993 for 
Iowa corn, more money would flow to farmers under S. 1580 because of increased coverage 
levels.  But in a good crop year, S. 1666 results in higher producer income due to the risk 
management payments and lower producer premiums.  Producer premiums are lower under S. 
1666 because the additional subsidy under S. 1580 does not completely offset the increase in 
premium rates from the higher coverage level. 
 
For the irrigated cotton farm, the increase in coverage level to 75% means an extra 
$36/acre in coverage.  The net cost of this additional coverage (the additional premium required 
to move from 65 to 75 percent coverage) is $7.56/acre.  In a low-yield year, the irrigated cotton 
farmer has a net benefit of $21.97/acre under S. 1580.  When a yield loss does not occur, S. 1666 
yields a net benefit of $14.03 per acre; this is comprised of a reduction in producer-paid 
premiums (due to lower coverage) of $7.56/acre and risk management payments of $6.47/acre.  
 
Somewhat surprisingly, S. 1580 benefits the lower risk farms more than the higher risk 
farms.  The difference in per-acre benefits from S. 1580 when a loss occurs is $7.32 for the 
dryland cotton farm and $2.33 for the North Dakota wheat farm, whereas the Iowa corn farm 
benefits by $20.38.  The reason for this is higher coverage levels under S. 1580 translate into a 
higher dollar amount of coverage for the higher-yielding, low risk farms. 
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Additional Indirect Impacts 
With regards to indirect impacts, if farmers’ crop insurance decisions regarding coverage 
levels and the type of products that they purchase are held constant, then the only difference 
between the two plans is that farmers receive greater premium subsidies under S. 1580 and they 
receive fixed payments under S. 1666.  However, the increased premium subsidies of S. 1580 
will likely lead to many farmers increasing the amount of insurance they purchase and/or 
switching to revenue insurance products.  The increased coverage would lead to increased 
indemnity payments when losses occur, an increased ability to secure production financing, and 
possibly, a decreased reliance on disaster payments when crop yields are low.  The switch to the 
revenue insurance products could increase farmers’ use of forward contracts and an increased 
ability to withstand within-year price shocks. 
 
The extent to which these additional benefits accrue depends critically on whether 
farmers will increase their coverage and change their product choice in response to the increased 
subsidies under S. 1580.  If farmers do not change their decisions, then the increased premium 
subsidies act as a direct transfer to producers with no “slippage” of funds going to crop insurance 
companies.  If farmers do change their crop insurance decisions, “slippage” to crop insurance 
companies would occur through changes in delivery expense reimbursement (roughly 24 percent 
of the change in total premiums) and underwriting costs (highly variable).   
 
Crop insurance helps producers manage financial risks in several ways.  Financial losses 
can be offset by insurance indemnities rather than reducing the producer's equity.  The ability to 
assign indemnity payments to lenders can make loans easier to obtain.  Indemnity payments 
support producers in maintaining their cash flow requirements.  Abundant evidence suggests 
linkages among crop insurance, forward marketing, and agricultural lending.  We have selected 
several recent quotes (shown below, with references) that outline the effects of crop insurance on 
these issues. 
 
"North Carolina bankers insist on crop insurance for tobacco before they will loan a 
farmer operating money." 
-- Chris Stancill, North Carolina farmer, in "Surviving Floyd", posted on the Internet at 
http://www.act.fcic.usda.gov/news/1999/11/survivefloyd.html 
 
"They (crop insurance and sound marketing plans) help farmers use credit more wisely 
and they reduce the bank's risk as well." 
-- Kim Fanning, McCook National Bank, for an article in Farm Progress, also posted on 
the Internet in "Risk Management:  Looking for Linkages at the Local Level" by Jan 
Eliassen at http://www.ag-risk.org/NCISPUBS/LAIPPUB/Artic17.htm 
 
"CRC (Crop Revenue Coverage) gives us the safety net to market more bushels at ease 
without the risk that normally goes through your mind." 
-- Ken Heidzig, Nebraska farmer, in "Managing for Profit:  How One Farm Family 
Succeeds" by Laurence M. Crane, posted on the Internet at 
http://www.ag-risk.org/NCISPUBS/LAIPPUB/Artic20.htm 
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The representative farm analysis suggests that producers will be more likely to participate 
in crop insurance under S. 1580 and that they will likely buy higher levels of coverage.  Thus the 
total amount of ancillary benefits from the crop insurance program will be higher under S. 1580 
than S. 1666.  Estimation of the ancillary benefits of higher coverage is difficult, if not 
impossible to quantify because they are farm and operator specific.  For example, a farm 
operation that has a solid balance sheet will find that the ability to obtain additional financing 
does not depend on the amount of crop insurance purchased.  And it goes without saying that 
“peace of mind” benefits are not straightforward to estimate.  Hence, while these benefits exist, 
we cannot place a dollar value on these additional benefits. 
 
Effect on Demand for Revenue Insurance Products 
The baseline scenario and S. 1666 limit the amount of subsidy available to revenue 
insurance products to the amount that would be available had the farmer purchased APH 
insurance.  This provision means that the percentage subsidy for revenue insurance is lower than 
for APH insurance when revenue insurance costs more than APH insurance, even though the 
dollar amount of subsidy is the same.  S. 1580 eliminates this provision and applies the premium 
subsidy percentages directly to revenue insurance premiums.  Thus the producer premium for the 
revenue insurance products that cost more than yield insurance (APH) would be significantly 
lower under S. 1580 than under S. 1666.  This would tend to increase the demand for the revenue 
insurance products that include Crop Revenue Coverage (CRC) and Revenue Assurance (RA) 
with its optional harvest price option.  Additional representative farm-level analysis showed that 
there would be an increased incentive for farmers to switch from APH to RA or CRC.   
 
Non-insured Crop Disaster Assistance Program Changes 
The Non-insured Crop Disaster Assistance Program (NAP) provides yield loss protection 
for non-insurable crops.  Under S. 1580, the major changes to the program are the removal of the 
area loss trigger and the addition of a service fee paid by producers for enrollment in the 
program.  Producers will be required to pay a service fee equivalent to the fee for catastrophic 
crop insurance coverage (currently $60 per crop per county).  These changes will have (partially) 
offsetting effects on the program.  The removal of the area loss trigger will increase the 
likelihood of a payment under NAP.  This should also encourage producer participation in the 
program.  However, the requirement of a service fee for enrollment in the program will likely 
decrease NAP participation.  If participation patterns follow those of current insurable specialty 
crops, then roughly 50 percent of the NAP eligible acres would be enrolled in the program.  
 
Specialty Crop Insurance Projections 
 For our analysis of the impact of S. 1580 on specialty crop insurance, we define specialty 
crops as any crop except barley, corn, oats, rice, sorghum, soybeans, upland cotton, and wheat.  
Under S. 1580, insured specialty crop acreage increases by 1.1 million acres from baseline levels.   
Producer-paid premiums, total premiums, and total indemnities also increase substantially.  The 
average additional net benefit (indemnities less producer-paid premiums) to specialty crop 
producers from crop insurance under S. 1580 (in comparison to the baseline) is just over $1 
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billion.  Roughly 27 percent of the additional net benefits under S. 1580 are captured by specialty 
crop producers. 
 
Administrative and Producer Costs of S. 1666 
 As with any program, there will be administrative costs associated with verification of 
eligibility and distribution of payments.  In addition, there will be costs associated with the 
development of the rules and regulations for the new program.  In order to get an estimate of 
these costs, inquiries have been made of USDA staff regarding the costs of distributing past 
programs such as disaster assistance.  However, USDA was not able to provide an estimate in 
time to be included in this report.        
 
 For a producer to be eligible for risk management payments under S. 1666, they must 
engage in two of eight approved risk management practices.  The eight practices include such 
things as purchasing crop insurance, using futures and/or options, forward cash contracting, 
attending a marketing/risk management seminar, using the payments to pay-down debt, and 
diversifying production.  Some producers will qualify for the payments based on their current 
activities.  For example, approximately 70% of eligible acreage is currently enrolled in the crop 
insurance program, effectively meeting one of the two requirements.  A portion of producers will 
also satisfy one of the requirements through their existing use of futures and forward contracting.  
Recent surveys of producers have found substantially different results regarding the use of 
marketing tools.  A survey of farmers in Texas, Nebraska, Indiana, and Mississippi found a range 
of 14 percent to 50 percent used some type of forward contracting.  A 1997 survey of 800 grain 
producers in southern Minnesota suggested that 74 percent of respondents used forward 
contracting. 
 
 There will be producers who must change their current management practices in order to 
qualify for the Lugar payments.  Depending on the options picked, there may or may not be 
significant costs associated with these changes.  For example, if a producer chooses to attend a 
marketing seminar, there are those offered by private consulting services that may cost in the 
neighborhood of $500 to attend.  However, there are less costly options such as seminars/courses 
provided through University extension.  In most cases, the courses are free or have a minimal 
cost.  If a producer chooses to use a futures/options contract, there may also be a charge.  For a 
futures or option contract, the producer will incur a commission charge.  However, those can 
vary greatly depending on whether the trade is through a full-service broker or over the Internet.  
If the producer uses a forward cash contract, there should be no direct charge.  Finally, if a 
producer uses the money to reduce debt levels, the result will be a savings in interest charges. 
